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Abstract 
Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a technology that 
employs basic identifier of an object embedded in a chip, 
transmitted via radio wave, for identification. An RFID Card 
responds to query/interrogation irrespective of ‘Who’ holds the 
Card; like a key to a door. Since an attacker can possess the 
card, access to such object can therefore be easily 
compromised. This security breach is classified as an 
unauthorized use of Card, and it forms the bedrock for RFID 
Card compromise especially in access control. As an on-card 
authentication mechanism, this research proposed a concept 
termed Bio-Thentic Card, which can be adopted to prevent this 
single point of failure of RFID Card. The Bio-Thentic Card was 
fabricated, tested and assessed in line with the known threats, 
and attacks; and it was observed to proffer substantive solution 
to unauthorized use of RFID Card vulnerability. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology is a 
technology that has gained wider adoption into the human 
everyday life since its first usage in identification friend or foe 
(IFF) during the II world war
 [1, 3]
. RFID is characterized by its 
ubiquitous nature, flexibility, mobility and integratability, 
which has contributed to its adoption in places such as access 
control system, conveyor control system, banking notes, item 
identification e.t.c. While RFID pros have greatly improve 
other technology, its cons has also generated series of security 
and privacy challenges 
[2, 3, 6]
 some to the detriment of the 
system being integrated into 
[4, 5]
. However, such challenges are 
not limited to only RFID systems, but peculiar to RFID 
systems, are attacks such as relay attack, cloning, clandestine 
tracking, unauthorized tag read, and unauthorized tag use 
[2, 6, 8]
 
. Un-authorization of card use is a general challenge in access 
control system; hence, most systems would require a secondary 
control mechanism.  
However, the integration of the RFID tag into access control 
Card otherwise known as RFID Card has further complicated 
the challenges in access control cards leading to  greater trade-
offs  in security and privacy
[3, 6,7, 8]
. Access control RFID card 
do not provide on-card authentication system hence is openly 
vulnerable to attacks that breach the confidentiality of a secured 
system. RFID Card responds to interrogation from an RFID 
Reader irrespective of ‘who’ holds the card, or whether the 
subject has the required privilege to do so. This lack of 
authorization priori to interrogation can be said to be the 
principal point of failure of the RFID Card. For instance, 
consider the situation where an unauthorized subject with 
malicious intent or the otherwise, gains access to a classified 
data through a stolen RFID Card and consequently jeopardize 
the confidentiality of the system under protection. It suffixes to 
note that, to the best of our knowledge, no known 
countermeasure addressed this single point of failure of the 
RFID Card.  
However, mitigating this critical point of failure is not as trivial 
as it sounds. Faraday shield model in [1] is popular method 
(aluminum-foiled wallet for example) of shielding the RFID 
Card from unauthorized tag reading, thus enhancing the privacy 
protection of the RFID tag. The unauthorized tag use as applied 
to RFID Card is the main goal of this paper as analyzed in [31]. 
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
highlights the related research works on RFID tag with 
reference to its physical layer, discusses the principal point of 
failure of the RFID Card. Section III introduces the concept 
used in this study, detailed the design and result of this study. 
Section IV presents the analysis and the conclusion of this 
concept. 
II. RELATED RESEARCH 
RFID Card is a composition of antenna unit, memory unit, 
processing unit, and a tag, which communicates with an RFID 
Reader wirelessly using the near field coupling principle. Over 
the past decades researchers have worked extensively on the 
RFID system but interest on RFID on-card authentication 
system have received minimal attention. According to [4, 9], 
the physical layer of the RFID system is the perimeter defense 
line for security tightening in RFID system. RFID 
authentication protocols 
[10, 11, 12, 13, 14]
 are designed to mitigate 
communication attacks between the tag and the Reader. 
Similarly, various lightweight cryptographic protocols and 
techniques 
[15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,]
 have also been designed to combat 
security vulnerabilities in the RFID system. However, these 
authentication practices do not apply to the tag end of the 
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physical layer of the RFID system. Additionally, techniques 
such as blocker tag 
[21]
, RFID guardian 
[22]
, RFID zapper 
[23]
, 
Faraday shield
 [30] 
and clipped tag 
[24]
 are mitigation to distance 
attacks, which does not necessarily translate affect RFID cards 
due to short range of communication. However, in [25], a 
framework for user’s authentication procedure was modeled 
using fingerprint authentication through reader-system 
authentication process, a similar process to [26] which is adopts 
a two-factor authentication system based on combined 
fingerprint recognition and smart RF Card verification. They 
however failed to address the underlying problem of the on-
Card authentication of the RFID card. In [27, 28] different 
categories of RFID card suitable for different security 
integration were designed but they lacked the core and essential 
component of card security: user authentication. [31] gives a 
detailed analysis of the challenges in RFID card with reference 
to its physical layer. Table 1 gives the summary of the various 
countermeasures proposed against the physical layer 
authentication vulnerabilities.  
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Physical-Layer 
Identification 
technique 
× × √ × × × × 
 
× 
 
√ 
Faraday Cage  √ × × × √ √ √ √ × 
Authentication 
protocol  
√ × × √ √ √ √ √ × 
Clipped Tag  √ × × √ √ √ × √ × 
Anti-counterfeiting √ × √ √ √ √ √ × × 
Biometric 
authentication 
× × × × × × × × √ 
Labeling ONLY create awareness for users 
 
Controllable Tag  √ × × √ √ √ √ √ × 
 
The physical layer identification technique 
[29]
 addresses 
cloning of tags, and proves that no two tags can have the same 
fingerprint. Furthermore, controllable tag
[27]
 addressed the issue 
of unauthorized tag read, thus curbing one of the principal 
source of attacks on RFID tag.  However, on-card 
authentication vulnerability, which is a major security 
challenge, have received little or no attention as shown in Table 1 
Countermeasure such as clipped tag, and fingerprint biometric 
authentication
 [25]
 can be combined in a digitalized manner to 
curtail this challenge. In the next session we, present our 
concept of Bio-Thentic Card as a concept of On-Card 
authentication process, which is a combination of digitalized 
controllable clip tag and fingerprint authentication system.  
 
III. ON-CARD AUTHENTICATION CONCEPT 
The architecture of the RFID Card reveals that 
communication between the Card and the Reader is hinged on 
the interconnection between the antenna unit and the tag inside 
of the Card. The antenna (usually rectangular spiral) unit of the 
RFID card is the medium of interaction between the tag of the 
RFID Card and the RFID Reader. Hence, the connectivity, 
transmission range and power supply to the RFID tag is a 
function of the antenna unit. Suppose we represent the 
communication process as Cp which is the integration of the 
antenna unit joints (Auj), and the RFID tag (Rt). For the sake of 
this paper, we represent every other parameter surrounding the 
RFID tag such as battery, memory unit, as RFID tag. We also 
assume that the antenna unit is the suitable antenna for RFID 
card. The communication process, Cp is given by equation (i).  
 
Cp  = ∑ (  ∑ Rt  x Auj )  (1) 
 
If Auj = 0, then, the communication process Cp presented in 
equation (i) becomes: 
 
Cp  = ∑ (  ∑ Rt  x 0) = 0   (2) 
 
This illustrates that if the possible contact between the RFID 
tag and the antenna unit can be disconnected such that the total 
corresponding antenna unit connection is zero, then, the 
antenna communication process (Cp) will be zero. With this 
criteria, we observed that the unauthorized use of card 
vulnerability in the RFID Card can be mitigated using the 
combination of digitally clippable tag-antenna-joint, and a 
biometric authentication system, preferably, fingerprint, as 
analyzed in [31]. Furthermore, we observed that a strategic 
placement of a digitally controllable hinge between the antenna 
and the tag in such as way that the antenna forms a shield 
around the tag, when totally disconnected from the tag, will 
prevent privacy disclosure, tracking and all radio wave related 
attacks. When this clippable joint is then strictly controlled by 
an authentic subject, the single point of failure of the RFID 
Card can thus be mitigated. We termed this concept Bio-
Thentic Card (BTC), which is the integration of biometric 
component into the RFID tag 
 
 
 
i=0 
k 
j=0 
n 
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Table 1: Countermeasure to physical layer Authentication 
Challenges 
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IV. RESEARCH METHOD 
Our research aimed at conceptualizing an RFID Card (which 
we called BTC) which can mitigate the unauthorized Card use 
vulnerability. In order to achieve our aim, we designed our 
methodology into three distinct stages.  
Stage1: this stage comprises the design, calibration, simulation 
and fabrication of the card antenna unit. In this stage, we 
analyzed thoroughly; the suitable positioning, and control of the 
clippable joint, such that the Card will respond to interrogation 
only through the contact from the clip joint.  
Stage2: this stage involves the acquiring, authenticating, 
securing and storage of the biometric authentication process, 
fingerprint in this case. We carefully considered the choice of 
the fingerprint module to use in line with information security 
practices such as security of the fingerprint module (live 
fingerprint detection, and false error rate) and secure code 
development practice. 
Stage3: this stage involves the integration of the various 
modules, and the control module. The result and testing process 
is detailed in the next session. The control unit integrates the 
biometric fingerprint and the fabricated antenna unit into a 
single module controlled by a microcontroller. Figure 1 gives a 
detailed description of the our designed methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Output from the clip joint and the Faraday cage must be 
‘Yes’ before stage1 can be passed to stage2 as shown in Figure 
1. The communication between stages 1, 2 and 3 is illustrated in 
Figure 2. We designed a rectangular loop antenna consisting of 
stripped copper lines, with external dimension of 54x33mm, 
0.5mm width, 7 turns, 1mm spacing and 0.035mm thickness 
using a computer simulation technology (CST) studio as shown 
in Figure 3 and 4. The design comprises a PCB made of FR4-
lossy dielectric material with thickness of 1.6mm, dimension of 
60x40mm, relative permeability of 1, and relative electric 
permittivity of 4.55. 
We integrated the clipped joint as shown in Figure 3 through 
the fabrication process of the card antenna unit with a 
13.56MHz RFID tag (see Figure 5). The digitalized controllable 
hinge was introduced through a miniature relay of 1A, 5V 
direct current, and internal coil resistance of 166ohms. Upon 
simulation, we arrived at an S-parameter value of -2.730712, 
which we considered as suitable for our experimental purpose 
as illustrated in Figure 4.  
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V. BIO-THENTIC CARD (BTC) 
A secured fingerprint module was adopted for the biometric 
authentication process. Moreover, it was designed as an on-card 
biometric match system. Two distinct fingerprints of the 
authentic user are required for the operation of the Card. 
Additionally; we stored other fingerprints templates for testing 
purpose, and tagged them with various identities. The 
communication process shown in Figure 4 depicts the link 
between the fingerprint module, and the antenna unit of the card 
controlled by the control unit. Visual description of the BTC is 
given in Figure 5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The control unit was designed using an Atmel AVR-Atmega-
8515 microcontroller securely coded using assembly language 
and AVR studio 4. However, different light emitting diodes 
(LEDs) were used as indicator on the state of the Card at any 
given point in operation (see Table 2).  
VI. DISCUSSION 
We tested the concept following the procedure stated in Figure 
6, and it responded as programmed, practically denying access 
to unauthorized user.  
Furthermore, we subjected BTC to different degree of risk 
assessment, a process synonymous with fault testing in 
electronics, or penetration testing in networking environment. 
In order to evaluate this concept, we demonstrated the 
following risk assessment processes.  
Tag Manipulation: we placed the Card at various angles, 
proximities and direction to an RFID reader without due 
authorization from the authentic user. However, there was no 
interrogation. Clip joint circumvention: We assumed that an 
attacker could gain access to the internal architecture of the 
Card (which is practically infeasible). We bridged the clip joint 
using connecting cables at first, and later using a 5v supply unit.  
Fingerprint module 
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Figure 2: Communication process of the Bio-Thentic Card 
Figure 3: Antenna structure  
Figure 4: S-parameters as a function of frequency 
Figure 5: Fabricated Result of Antenna Unit 
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The former could not initiate the interrogation but the later 
attempted to trigger the switch trigger (a 5v relay in this case). 
Fingerprint manipulation: We forged an OHP film fingerprint 
of the residue print on the surface of the scanner. This forges 
film was then disguised as an authentic user. The evaluation 
process further proved the security potency of this concept. The 
fingerprint manipulation could not initiate interrogation due the 
secured practice exhibited in the requirement for authorization.  
However, we discovered that unauthorized tag use could be 
mitigated with this concept. In addition , a securely design 
process, and a more aligned fabrication process of the clip joint,  
such attack is practically infeasible or extremely expensive. 
Other forms of risk associated with the typical RFID Card can 
thus be successfully mitigated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Templat
e label 
Atmega-
8515 
Pin-out 
Control 
Effect 
Indication 
A and B PORTB, 
6:4 
PORTD 7 
Miniature / 
Green-LED 
Authorized user with 
access permission, 
access granted 
C PORTD, 6 Yellow-
LED 
Authorized user 
without access 
permission, access 
denied 
D PORTD, 5 Blue-LED Unauthorized user, 
access denied 
E PORTD, 4 Red-LED Unauthorized user, 
access denied (and 
further warning may 
be indicated  
Table 2: Control Output Indication 
POWER-ON THE 
CONTROL UNIT 
When finger = Right-index, 
Yellow-LED activated:     When 
finger = Right-thumb, Blue-LED 
activated:       When finger = 
unknown, Red-LED activated on 
the Card for a duration of 2sec. 
Place the left-
index finger on 
the fingerprint 
module 
Place the left-
thumb finger on 
the fingerprint 
module 
 
Card responds to 
interrogation 
and indicator 
ON. 
Place the card 
closer to the 
RFID reader 
Place other finger on 
the fingerprint 
module 
Place the card closer 
to the RFID reader 
No interrogation responds 
from the RFID reader, and 
a corresponding level of 
authority is activated. 
Figure 6a: Testing Procedure for Authentic User 
Figure 6b: Generic Testing Procedure 
 
STEPS INDICATOR 
Power ON the control 
module 
Place the LEFT-INDEX 
finger on the fingerprint 
Module, for1sec. 
Place the LEFT-
THUMB finger on the 
fingerprint Module, for 
1sec. 
Place the Bio-Thentic 
Card closer to the 
RFID Reader 
The Bio-Thentic Card 
responds to 
interrogation 
One time Beep sound, Blue 
light on the fingerprint 
module, Power-ON LED 
activated 
One time Beep Sound, 
Blinking blue light on the 
fingerprint module  
One time Beep sound, once 
blink of the blue light on the 
fingerprint module, green 
LED activated for  
The Card is activated for 
duration, based on the level 
of user’s responsiveness, 3-
seconds in this case. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 
The main contribution of this paper is derived from the research 
carried out on authentication of an RFID card holder, on the 
card itself. This is predicated on the fact that the confidentiality 
of a system that adopts the use of RFID Card is vulnerable to 
unauthorized use. This paper therefore presents a concept of on-
card authentication system as a preventive measure against 
unauthorized use of RFID Card. An on-card authentication 
system called Bio-Thentic card was designed, fabricated and 
evaluated. Furthermore, the Card was subjected to various 
known attacks, as a risk evaluation measure. The Bio-Thentic 
card proves to mitigate unauthorized Card use, and 
consequentially, prevents most known attacks against the RFID 
Card.   
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